Voluntary Euthanasia by Morris, Arval A.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 45 Number 2 
4-1-1970 
Voluntary Euthanasia 
Arval A. Morris 
University of Washington School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Disability Law Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Arval A. Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 Wash. L. Rev. 239 (1970). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol45/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 45, Number 2, 1970
VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
Arval A. Morris*
Not many people plan or talk about death, especially their own. It
is a grim topic, and that is probably why death is so little considered.'
In our society, death is more taboo than sex. But death remains im-
portant, not only because each of us must confront it, but because
death, today, has more clearly become a matter of timing.' Many
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. BA., Colorado College, 1951; MA.,
1952, J.D., 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., Yale, 1958.
1. For scholarly comment see, A. B. DOwNG, EUmANASIA AND THE RiGHT To DEAT
(1969) [hereinafter cited as DOWNGI. This fine book contains eleven essays dealing
with euthanasia by commission and omission-all but one of them is favorable to reform-
ing the law; N. ST. Jom-STFVAs, THE RIGHT TO L= (1964); the excellent book by
GrANvx . VmLIAlrs, THE SANcTiTY op' LsE AxD TEm CamnmAL LAW (1957); JosEPH
FLETcHER, MoRALs Am MEDicin= (1954), and J. SuLLiVAx, THE MonsirrA or MaRcY
KMZNG (1949). Also see, Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. CRa .
L.C. & P.S. 351 (1969); Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. REv. 178
(1966); Levisohn, Voluntary Mercy Deaths, 8 J. FOR. MED. 57 (1961); Kamisar, Some
Non-religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MaNn. L. REv.
969 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kamisar , the reply by Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Leg-
islation-A Rejoinder, 43 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1958) thereinafter cited as Williams], and
Silving, Euthanasia: A Study In Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. Rtv. 350
(1954).
2. When is a person dead? Traditionally the moment of death has been deter-
mined by the moment when spontaneous heartbeat and breathing cease. These age-
old criteria have become known as the signs of 'clinical' death. Throughout history
there have been reports of rare individuals who returned to life after such clinical
death. And in recent decades we have learned emergency measures to restore breath-
ing and heartbeat that can bring back to life many people who in the past would
have been dead permanently.
'Biological death' has been defined as the state of damage and disorganization
from which, even with modem medical techniques, the whole person cannot be
revived. Various organs die at different rates once heartbeat and breathing have
ceased. The brain, highly vulnerable to lack of oxygen, becomes irreversibly dam-
aged after only three to six minutes without freshly oxygenated blood, whereas
other organs may survive many hours or even days depending on the conditions
of the body, such as temperature and presence or absence of bacteria.
'Cellular death' is an irreversible degeneration or disorganization of the individual
cell, and may precede or be delayed long after the death of the rest of the body.
For example, throughout life dead skin cells over the entire body surface are con-
stantly shed and replaced from below. On the other hand, cells from a dead person
can be kept alive and growing indefinitely in a cell culture. And it is from a pre-
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people argue to the contrary, but they sound as though they are dealing
with Gods whose only problem of choice is between eternal life or
eternal death. Ordinary mortals do not confront these Olympian choices.
For us, it is simply, death now, or death later. That is the only real
choice we have; it is a mere matter of timing. Recognition of this simple
truth implies that man has a choice, and makes it possible to discuss
the question whether death may be preferable at some time before
biological destruction of the body insures its inevitable coming.
Our choice is made poignant because modern medicine has found
ways of delaying death, and prolonging life. This does not mean that
modern medicine necessarily prolongs our living a full and robust life
because in some cases it serves only to prolong mere biological existence
during the act of dying. Under these tragic circumstances a prolonged
life can mean the prolongation of a heart-beat that activates the husk
of a mindless, degenerating body that sustains an unknowing and piti-
able life-one without vitality, health or any opportunity for normal
existence-an inevitable stage in the process of dying: 4
served sex cell or general body cell that, as we found earlier, a child or identical
twin of a person dead for years or centuries might someday be produced.
Dr. R. Gorney, The New Biology And The Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 273,
311-12 (1968). Not being a unitary event, death is divided into organismal death, psychic
death and vegetative death, each stage occurring at a different time, but all within 15
minutes of each other. See, Dr. J. W. Still, The Three Levels of Human Life and Death,
The Presumed Location of the Soul, and Some of the Implications for the Social Prob-
lems of Abortion, Birth Control, and Euthanasia, 37 MED. ANNALS OF D. C. 316 (1968).
3. F. W. Reid, Jr., Prolongation of Life or Prolonging the Act of Dying? 202
J.A.M.A. 180 (1967), and see Dr. Joseph Fletcher, The Patient's Right to Die, in
DowNINo, supra note 1, at 61, 63.
4. Taken from G. A. Gresham, "A Time To Be Born and a Time to Die," in DowN-
ING, supra note 1, at 148.
The London Times, under the caption "Doctor succumbs after eight years in coma,"
carried the following dispatch from its correspondent, dated Ankara, Sept. 22, 1969:
A young orthopaedic doctor was being buried in Ankara today after having lived
for more than eight years in a coma, one of the longest on medical record.
On July 20, 1961, Mr. Alp Reel, then 25, was X-raying a patient at Ankara
medical faculty when he received a powerful electric shock. For 3,044 days he lay
in the medical faculty hospital in a specially made German bed with air mattresses.
His eyes were open, his heart beat and he breathed normally, but for all practical
purposes he was dead from the moment he received the shock.
His doctor, Professor Orhan Titi, said that there had been no brain activity
since the accident and that the only signs of life were an occasional reflex in his
face, fingers and toes. Mr. Reel's mother and father, who had never given up hope
that one day he would recover, professed to have seen an improvement over the
years. Sometimes, they said, he smiled and murmured like a child.
Specialists from Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan were
consulted but none of them was able to suggest a possible cure. Mr. Reel died of
inflarnation of the lungs last Friday night.
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One day a middle-aged woman became suddenly blind in one
eye. The terror of this unheralded experience was rapidly offset
by recovery of vision in subsequent weeks. Attacks of giddiness
and shaking of the legs and head followed, again to improve but
again to reappear. This was the onset of multiple sclerosis, a dis-
order where disseminated foci of damage occur throughout the
brain and spinal cord. Slowly but inexorably the patient was forced
to bed and was ultimately unable to leave it because of paralysis
of the lower limbs. Soon, control of the bladder and anal muscles
led to incontinence of urine and faeces. Bed sores developed and
were so large and deep that the underlying bones of the pelvis were
eroded as well. This abject image of misery and pain was kept
going by the frequent administration of antibiotic and pain-re-
lieving drugs. Is it justifiable to prolong such a life, if life it be?
In this question we are faced with the fundamental problem of the
meaning of man's existence.
Today, death and the process of dying are being invested with new
dimensions. 5 They are being forced upon us by increasing medical ca-
pacities and by increasing human sensitivity and concern about volun-
tary euthanasia.
That there has been an advancing public concern and sympathy for
voluntary euthanasia is well-illustrated by a 1969 Chicago case.0 One
Mrs. Waskin, a hospitalized victim of terminal leukemia, had pleaded
with her twenty-three-year-old son to kill her, and had herself un-
successfully attempted to commit suicide by taking sleeping pills. Three
days after she made her request for death, at a time when she was in
deep pain, her son killed her by shooting her three times in the head.
S. Although there has not yet been any definitive documentation of the view, it
seems fairly apparent that Western. society has gradually become increasingly
humanitarian in its outlook. Suffering is no longer believed to have religious value.
A decline in the belief of an afterlife has meant that the importance of this life is
magnified. These factors have contributed to concern for the quality of both life
and 'dying.'
There has also been a change in social attitudes toward human intervention at
both the beginning and the end of life. Birth and death are now viewed as events
which need not be blindly accepted by human beings . . . . Suicide and euthanasia
are being tolerated to a greater extent, or at least viewed differently. Consequently,
we are in the midst of developing new ethics.
D. Crane, Social Aspects Of The Prolongation of Life 7 (1969) (An Occasional Paper
Of The Russell Sage Foundation).
6. Reported in the Chicago Tribune for Aug. 9, 1967, at 1, col. 8; Aug. 10, 1967,
at 1, col. 2, and January 25, 1969, at 1, col. 8; and discussed by Sanders, Euthanasia:
None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. Crni. L.C. & P.S. 351 (1969), and Kutner, Due Process
of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 INDisA L.J. 539 (1969).
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The son admitted killing his mother, and was arrested and charged
with murder; but at trial, it took the jury only forty minutes of delib-
eration to find him not guilty by reason of insanity. Furthermore, the
jury found that his insanity was only temporary; that it was not likely
to recur, and he was released. From the facts of this case, it seems
highly unlikely that the son was ever really insane. A more likely
explanation is that the jury was moved by the human drama before
it, and sympathized with the terrible plight of the family and that of
the son. The "murder" was an excusable mercy killing, an act of com-
passion.
7
7. Public sympathy for the killer in a non-requested mercy killing has been rising.
Mr. Sanders has collected the involuntary euthanasia cases that have led to prosecution,
60 J. CRam. L.C. & P.S. 355-56 n.36. They show a growing concern for the propriety
of mercy killing, even though the victim may not have requested it:
a. Louis Greenfield chloroformed his imbecile teenage son to death. The boy
reportedly had the mentality of a two year old. Greenfield said at the trial, "I did
it because I loved him, it was the will of God." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1939, at 10,
col. 2. He was acquitted of first degree manslaughter. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1939,
at 1, col. 5.
b. Louis Repouille read about the Greenfield case. He said, "It made me think
about doing the same thing to my boy." N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1939, at 21, col. 2.
Repouille chloroformed his thirteen year old son, who had been blind for five years,
bedridden since infancy and was also an imbecile, who never learned to talk. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 1939, at 25, col. 7. Repouille was indicted for first degree man-
slaughter but convicted of second degree manslaughter and freed on a suspended
sentence of five to ten years. N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1941, at 44, col. 1.
c. John Noxon, a well-to-do lawyer, was charged with first degree murder for
killing his six month old mongoloid son by wrapping him in a lamp cord and
electrocuting him. Noxon claimed that the boy's death was an accident. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28, 1943, at 27, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1943, at 23, col. 7; N.Y. Times,
Oct. 29, 1943, at 21, col. 7. Noxon was convicted of first degree murder. N.Y. Times,
July 7, 1944, at 30, col. 2. His death sentence was commuted to life. N.Y. Times, Dec.
30, 1948, at 13, col. 5. Later his sentence was further reduced to six years to life
to make parole possible. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1948, at 5, col. 6. He was paroled
shortly thereafter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1949, at 16, col. 3. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's decision and denied Noxon's request for a new trial,
based on technical grounds, in Commonwealth v. Noxon, 319 Mass. 495, 66 N.E.2d
814 (1946).
d. Harry Johnson asphyxiated his cancer stricken wife. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1938,
at 1, col. 3. After a psychiatrist said he believed Johnson to have been "temporarily
insane" the grand jury refused to indict him. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1938, at 30, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1938, at 46, col. 1.
e. Eugene Braunsdorf took this 29 year old daughter, a "spastic incapable of
speech," out of a sanitorium, and shot and killed her because he feared for her
future should he die. He then attempted suicide by shooting himself in the chest
twice. He was found not guilty by reason of insanity. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1950,
at 25, col. 4.
f. Dr. Herman Sander was acquitted of the murder of his cancer stricken patient.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1950, at 1, col. 4. Dr. Sander, for some unknown reason, had
written on his patient's chart that he had given her ten c.c. of air intravenously
four times and she died within ten minutes. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1950, at 1, col. 1.
At the trial, however, his defense was that the patient was already dead at the
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As this case illustrates, the time has come for man to rethink his
traditional attitudes toward death. We cannot continue to view death
in every circumstance as necessarily bad, something to be avoided, or
something for which punishment must necessarily follow when it is
inflicted upon another. Nor can we persist in believing that any kind of
life is so sanctified as to be preferred absolutely over death-rather,
we must replace our neurotic attitudes toward death8 with a more
time of the injections. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1950, at 1, col. 1. The patient apparently
did not request death. The case turned on the causation question and did not live up
to its billing as a case to decide the legality of euthanasia.
g. Miss Carol Ann Paget, a college girl, was indicted for second degree murder
(carrying a mandatory life sentence) for killing her father while he was still under
anesthetic following an exploratory operation which showed him to have cancer of
the stomach. The girl apparently had a cancer phobia and was acquitted on grounds
of "temporary insanity." N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1950, at 1, col. 2.
h. Harold Mohr killed his blind, cancer stricken brother and on a conviction of
voluntary manslaughter with recommendation for mercy he was sentenced to three
to six years and a $500 fine. N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1950, at 20, col. 5. He pleaded
insanity and there was testimony tending to show that his brother had repeatedly
requested to die. Some of the testimony, however, tended to show that Mohr was
drinking at the time and two other brothers testified against him. N.Y. Times,
Apr. 4, 1950, at 60, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1950, at 26, col. 1.
i. People v. Werner. The transcript of this case is presented in Williams, Euthanasia
and Abortion, 38 U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 178, 184-87 (1966). The defendant, 69, pleaded
guilty to manslaughter for the suffocation of his hopelessly crippled, bedridden wife.
The court found him guilty, but then after hearing testimony of the defendant's
children and others showing what great devotion the defendant had shown towards
his wife and that the murder had been at her request, the court allowed the guilty
plea to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty entered. Held: not guilty. For a
criticism of this obviously unorthodox procedure see 34 N.D. LAW 460 (1959).
It is interesting to compare the events in the Werner case with article 37 of the
URUGUAY~A PENAL CoDE: "The judges are authorized to forego punishment of a
person whose previous life has been honorable where he commits a homicide
motivated by compassion, induced by repeated requests of the victim." Slving,
Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. RaV. 350, 369
(1954).
j. Mrs. Wilhelmia Langevin, 56, shot her 35 year old son, an epileptic, with a
deer rifle. The was indicted for first degree murder. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1965, at
26, col. 6.
k. Robert Waskin. [The facts of this case are presented supra.]
The table below shows the various punishments inflicted on the persons above.
Punishments
First Lesser Acquittal by Refusal
Degree Degree Reason of to
Murder Homicide Insanity Acquittal Indict
-(1) (2) (3) (3) (1)
Noxon- Mohr Paget Sander Johnson
4 years Repouille Braunsdorf Greenfield
Waskin Werner
8. For discussion see, J. Mrr.Goa, THE Ai Axc. VAY oF DAT (1963).
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realistic view of death as a biological function. 9 Death for some persons
may be a gift, and for others, a favor. Similar concern for public
attitudes toward death was recently expressed by Dr. Edmund Leach:"0
Our ordinary morality says that we must kill our neighbour if
the state orders us to do so-that is to say, as a soldier in war or
as an executioner in the course of his duty-but in every other
case we must try to save life. But what do we mean by that?
Would a headless human trunk that was still breathing be alive?
And if you think that is just a fanciful question, what about a
body that has sustained irreparable brain damage but still can be
kept functioning by the ingenuity of modern science? It isn't so
easy.
For many Americans their fear is not so much of death but of the
tragic figure one might become before death. Moreover, there are many
persons who refuse to outlive their usefulness and become burdens to
themselves and others." Suicide is an option open only to those persons
possessing the necessary means and the physical strength and ability to
use them. It is hollow to hold that a man may, in certain circumstances,
be justified in ending his life to avoid great pain and terminal suffering,
but to deny justification to his call upon a willing expert for assistance
in that task.'2 If we are to honor human dignity, we must not only
change our attitudes toward death-we must also cease to leave the pro-
cess of dying to chance and to the progressive disintegration of the
body. The purpose of this article is to contribute to our necessary
rethinking of death through a consideration of voluntary euthanasia.
9. See Slater, Death: The Biological Aspect, in DOWNING, supra note 1, at 49. Death
performs a function for human society of incalculable value. If the aged and the
sick did not die soon after they stopped being self-supporting, but lingered on, en masse,
the total burden on society would be ruinous. Thus, "Death plays a wholly favourable,
indeed an essential, part in human economy. Without natural death, human societies
and the human race itself would certainly be unable to thrive." Id. at 59.
10. The Listener 749 (Dec. 7, 1967), and see, A. B. Downing, Euthanasia, The Human
Context, in DowNiNG, supra note 1, at 13.
11. The ugly truth is that sometimes patients in extremis try to outwit the doctors
and escape from medicine's ministrations. They swallow Kleenex to suffocate them-
selves, or jerk tubes out of their noses or veins, in a cat-and-mouse game of life
and death which is neither merciful nor meaningful. . . . Who is actually alive in
these contrivances and contraptions? In such a puppetlike state most patients are,
of course, too weakened and drugged to take any truly human initiative.
Dr. Joseph Fletcher, The Patient's Right to Die, in Dowwnw, supra note 1, at 61, 65, and
see, Exton-Smith, Terminal Illness in the Aged, 2 THE LANCET 305 (1961).
12. See, Gillon, Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia: Historical Perspective, in Dow-=c,
supra note 1, at 173.
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THE PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
To avoid the possibility of confusion, it is necessary to distinguish
voluntary euthanasia from other similar, but not necessarily related
situations. By voluntary euthanasia I refer to one specific situation,
and to no other. Any definition of the principle of voluntary euthanasia
must lay emphasis on the word "voluntary" as it specifically applies
to the right of an adult person who is in command of his faculties to
have his life ended by a physician, pursuant to his own intelligent
request, under specific conditions prescribed by law, and by painless
means. 3 Thus, voluntary euthanasia involves at least two willing per-
sons-a doctor and a patient. Considered solely from the perspective of
its recipient, apart from its medical assistance, voluntary euthanasia
is most akin to suicide. 4 Hence, with medical assistance rendered in
accordance with law, the term simply refers to legally-assisted suicide."5
But voluntary euthanasia is not subject to whim, nor indulged whenever
a person may decide he would like it; rather, it is carefully controlled
by statute and allowed only under rigorously defined circumstances. 6
Furthermore, voluntary euthanasia is "voluntary" on the part of the
doctor as well as the patient. There is no requirement that a doctor
must administer euthanasia to a patient. Instead, voluntary euthana-
sia provides a way for legalizing free choice-a liberty, and it requires
a willing patient and a willing doctor, acting under law. Nothing short
of that will do.
Voluntary euthanasia also involves an identifiable act of commission
by the attending doctor. Thus, it is to be distinguished from somewhat
similar forms of mercy-killing which involve only an omission. While a
fully generalized principle of voluntary euthanasia probably includes
acts of omission as well as acts of commission, I do not deal here with
the problem of omissions." Although the problem of omissions weighs
13. See, Flew, The Principle of Euthanasia, in DowNIa, supra note 1, at 30.
14. See, ]Barrington, Apologia for Suicide, in DOWN NG, supra note 1, at 152.
15. While suicide is not, assisting one to suicide is a crime in the great majority of
American States, except Texas where, apparently, the act of providing the means of
suicide is not a crime, but directly killing a sufferer is; see, Sanders v. State, 112 S.W.
68, 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908), and G. WLIAaS, THE SAncnrTy o
L= m Anm a Cpn qnAL LAW 301 (1957).
16. See text infra at note 53.
17. Specifically, I do not deal with the well known situation where a patient may
be afflicted with a terminal illness, suffering from excruciating pain, and pleading for
245
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heavily on the conscience of every sensitive doctor, 8 and certainly de-
serves the attention of legal scholars,19 its passive nature places it out-
side the present discussion which is restricted to the affirmative act of
voluntary euthanasia.
Finally, we must consider our subject matter with reference to those
who may be its intended recipients. I draw sharp distinctions among
the several groups who may be thought to be potential candidates for
euthanasia. For reasons discussed later, I restrict my discussion and
advocacy of voluntary euthanasia to only two categories of willing re-
cipients. First among these are the incurably ill; this class is defined
as including those adult persons who have a serious physical illness
which is both incurable and terminal, and which is expected either to
cause severe distress to the patient, or to render him incapable of lead-
ing a rational existence. The second category includes the so-called
"human vegetables;" this class is defined as those adult persons who
suffer a condition of irreversible brain damage or deterioration such
that their normal mental faculties are so severely impaired that they
are incapable of leading a rational existence. For example, a massive
stroke may destroy a man's ability to move, see, and hear, and to
reason or to organize his life. Other examples of permissible candidates
for voluntary euthanasia may have been rendered permanently un-
merciful release, every conceivable avenue of treatment having been explored with total
failure. Rather than keeping the patient temporarily alive by means of inserting tubes
into his stomach, veins, bladder or rectum, drugging him and then encompassing him
in a cocoon of oxygen, the doctor omits to carry out these, or other actions, thereby
allowing the patient to die earlier than he otherwise might.
18. The President of the Swedish Society of Surgery, Dr. G. B. Giertz has asked:
Is it in fact intended that we shall provide the medical services with resources for
furnishing life-supporting measures for every individual who might qualify for it,
even when the prospects of securing a recovery are negligible?
He continued:
The thought that we physicians should be obliged to keep a patient alive with a
respirator when there is no possibility of recovery, solely to try to prolong his life
by perhaps twenty-four hours, is a terrifying one. It must be regarded as a medical
axiom that one should not be obliged in every situation to use all means to prolong
life . . . . We refrain from treatment because it does not serve any purpose, be-
cause it is not in the patient's interest. I cannot regard this as killing by medical
means: death has already won, despite the fight we have put up, and we must ac-
cept the fact.
Quoted from DowxiNG, supra note 1, at 15. And Dr. Gottharo Booth, a psychiatrist, sug-
gests that if a patient is rational then his wishes should govern. See, M.D.'s, Clergy Discuss
Prolonging Lije, A.M.A. NEws 9 (May 9, 1966).
19. For tentative exploration see, Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WAsH. L. REV. 999
(1967), reprinted in DowNING, supra note 1, at 71.
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conscious by accident or disease; and, in many cases, their biological
lives may have been prolonged by artificial means.
Under my definition, 0 limiting the permissible candidates for vol-
untary euthanasia, there is no room for authorization of eugenics,
murder, genocide, or arbitary destruction of the sick, the deformed,
the senile, or the mentally deficient. The end to be achieved is not
human disposal, but, on the contrary, the enhancement of human dig-
nity by permitting each man's last act to be an exercise of his free
choice between a tortured, hideous death and a painless, dignified one.
This choice is not available under current law. Today, if a physician,
motivated solely by mercy, consciously and deliberately kills his suf-
fering patient in a painless manner at the request of the patient, his
act is considered to be murder-probably, in the first degree.2 Our
current law considers whether a killing has been done with premed-
itation and deliberation. The motive for which a killing has been com-
mitted is otherwise irrelevant, except insofar as it might affect the
sentence received upon conviction. Neither good motives, nor a request
or demand by the victim that he be killed, can now function to excul-
pate a person charged with murder or manslaughter.2 - Nor is it a de-
fense to such a charge that the death of the deceased was imminent,
or that the deceased was incurably and terminally ill and in extreme
pain. Present law forces the person who is incurably ill, or the so-called
"human vegetable," to endure the physical and mental misery often
20. The two categories of persons who qualify for voluntary euthanasia should be
sharply distinguished from persons in other categories who may want, or be thought to
need, euthanasia, but due to my imposed limitations, do not come within the two
definitions. For example, infants and young children who may suffer from gross genetic
physical or mental defects, and who may have only a short life expectancy, do not
qualify as "adults" who can give legal consent, and consequently, do not fall within the
two categories. Secondly, while adult, many old people suffering from senility, or who
may be mentally ill or retarded, or who have congenital physical defects, do not have
the necessarily serious, incurable and terminal physical illnesses and, consequently, do
not fall within the two categories. At least these persons, and perhaps others, are ex-
cluded.
21. See WAsH. R-v. CODE § 9.48.030 (1956). Other western countries handle mercy
killings differently. Uruguay, apparently, allows good motive and a request for death,
to operate as a complete defense, while in some European countries, e.g., Germany,
Switzerland, Norway, these factors officially function to reduce the penalty; see, Silving,
Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 350 (1954).
22. See, e.g., R. PEaRxIs, CRamwA. LAw 828 (2d ed. 1969); 2 W. BuRDIcx, LAw op
Cpm §§ 442, 447 (1946); 0. AixLER, C a.rns LAW 55, 172 (1934); Orth, Legal
Aspects Relating to Euthanasia, 2 M . MED. J. 120 (1953) (Symposium); and Annot.
25 AJ.R. 1007 (1923), and see, Kalven, A Special Corner of Civil Liberties: A Legal
View 131 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1223 (1956).
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accompanying the process of dying. Similarly, many doctors in such
circumstances consider themselves professionally obliged to do all they
can to keep the patient alive; thus, ironically, prolonging the agony of
death and the misery of the patient.23 In this way, many members of
the medical profession have reinforced the steadfast refusal of our law-
makers to allow a dignified and comfortable exit from life.24 Both pro-
fessions have relied upon the assumed absolute necessity of preserving
human life as the justification for a prolongation of abject indignity in
order to sustain biological life alone.
THE JUSTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA
One of the great tragedies that confuses almost every discussion
about voluntary euthanasia is the entanglement of social and medical
considerations with religion. Many among us still fail to perceive that
"those who hold the Faith may follow its precepts without requiring
those who do not hold it to act as if they did,"25 and that there is a big
difference between illegality and religious immorality. This confusion
23. Consider an actual case, in a top-flight hospital. After a history of rheumatic
heart disease a man was admitted with both mitral and aortic stenosis-a blockage
of the heart valves by something like a calcium deposit. The arts and mechanics of
medicine at once went into play. First open-heart surgery opened the mitral valve;
then-the patient's heart still sluggish-the operation was repeated. But the failure
of blood-pressure brought on kidney failure. While the doctors weighed a choice
between a kidney transplant and an artificial kidney machine, staphyloccal pneumonia
set in. Next, antibiotics were tried and failed to bring relief, driving them to try a
tracheotomy. Meanwhile the heart action flagged so much that breathing failed even
through the surgical throat opening. The doctors then tried oxygen through nasal
tubes, and failed; next, they hooked him into an artificial respirator. For a long
time, technically speaking, the machine did his breathing. Then, in spite of all their
brilliant efforts, he died.
In this case from the beginning some of the doctors had little hope, but they felt
obliged to do what they could. A few insisted that they had to do everything possible
even if they felt sure they would fail. Where can we draw the line between prolonging
a patient's life and prolonging his dying?
Quoted from DowuucO, supra note 1, at 64-65.
24. Furthermore, it seems that terminally ill, dying persons infrequently receive
effective emotional support from medical personnel, probably because medical personnel
prefer to treat them as though they were going to live; see, R. S. DUF & A. B. HoLLancs-
HEAD, SICKNESs AND SOCIETY (1968). Moreover, of 290 physicians studied, 90 percent
preferred not to tell terminal cancer patients that they had cancer, and held this pre-
ference largely on emotional grounds rather than on rational ones. Oken, What To
Tell Cancer Patients: A Study of Medical Attitudes 175 J.A.MA. 1120 (1961).




is peculiarly inappropriate and tragic in America where our Constitu-
tion has intentionally isolated religious affairs from secular affairs by
constructing a high wall of separation between church and state. Under
our Constitution a state is disabled from legislating on religion or on
religious grounds; conversely legislation cannot properly be defeated
solely for religious reasons. These limitations are part of a legislator's
constitutional duties. Unfortunately, however, the restriction on de-
feating legislation for religious reasons is of that unique type of neg-
ative duty whose breach is never brought before a court for review-if,
by breach of a legislator's duty, religious grounds are allowed to defeat
an otherwise permissible proposed statute, the result is simply an ab-
sence of legislation which is not a legitimate subject for judicial review
or redress.
The basic point is that religious grounds are constitutionally irrel-
evant. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated their irrelevancy within the
context of Sunday closing laws:"
To ask what interest, what objective, legislation serves, of
course, is not to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine the
necessary effects of what they have enacted. If the primary end
achieved by a form of regulation is the affirmation or promotion
of religious doctrine-primary, in the sense that all secular ends
which it purportedly serves are derivative from, not wholly in-
dependent of, the advancement of religion-the regulation is
beyond the power of the state .... Or if a statute furthers both
secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the effectua-
tion of the secular ends alone-where the same secular ends
could equally be attained by means which do not have con-
sequences for promotion of religion-the statute cannot stand.
A State may not endow a church although that church might in-
culcate in its parishioners moral concepts deemed to make them
better citizens, because the very raison d'gtre of a church, as op-
posed to any other school of civilly serviceable morals, is the
predication of religious doctrine.
The underlying constitutional foundation for this view is, of course,
the language of the First Amendment prohibiting both abridgment and
establishment of religion.
No question concerning abridgment of religion arises with respect
26. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67 (1961) (separate opinion).
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to the principle of voluntary euthanasia; no one suggests that euthana-
sia should be mandatory, or that a doctor should be punished or other-
wise officially sanctioned for not administering euthanasia. Rather, the
principle of voluntary euthanasia envisions a liberty, like the First
Amendment, and a legally sanctioned exercise of free choice respecting
the dignity of death.
The establishment clause of the First Amendment is relevant to the
discussion because it disallows the use of religious grounds to aid
either the success or defeat of voluntary euthanasia legislation. As
Professor Glanville Williams has convincingly illustrated, the strictly
religious arguments for and against voluntary euthanasia are relatively
weak and inconclusive." He concludes that "if it is true that [volun-
tary] euthanasia can be condemned only according to a religious opin-
ion this should be sufficient at the present day to remove the prohibition
from the criminal law."2 In addition, religious objections to voluntary
euthanasia must be deemed constitutionally impermissible on the
ground that state action (and inaction) based primarily upon religious
grounds violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The
meaning of this clause has often been expressed by the Supreme Court
in language such as this:20
[T]he "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertain-
ing or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church atten-
dance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small
27. G. WILLIAms, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRnimNAL LAW 311-18 (1957).
28. Id. at 312. Most religious objections are based on the Fifth Commandment hold-
ing that life and body are given by God, and that therefore, only God, not man, can
take them away. For sympathetic discussion see, N. ST. JoHN-STEVAs, THE RIGHT TO LIFE(1964); and J. SULLIVAN,, THE MoRALiTY OF MERcy KILLING (1949).
29. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). In recent years the Supreme
Court has evolved a "purpose and primary effect" test of the establishment clause: "to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion . ." Bd. of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963). Generally see, L. PFEER, CHuRcH, STATE AND FREEDOM (rev. ed.
1967).
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can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."
Thus, it is necessary to set apart and ignore all religious grounds and
arguments, whether they be for or against voluntary euthanasia;
30
under our constitutional form of government, they cannot be deter-
minative. Voluntary euthanasia legislation must stand or fall on its
secular merits, not its religious acceptability or repugnance.
What then, is the secular case for voluntary euthanasia? The case is
profound, yet its structure can be stated simply.3' Voluntary euthana-
sia can be justified by reference to three basic values of western
civilization: (1) prevention of cruelty; (2) allowance of liberty; and
(3) the enhancement of human dignity, an ultimate goal which is
achieved by adhering to the first two values.
All civilized men will agree that cruelty is an evil to be avoided. But
few people acknowledge the cruelty of our present laws which require
a man be kept alive against his will, while denying his pleas for merciful
release after all the dignity, beauty, promise and meaning of life have
vanished, and he can only linger for weeks or months in the last stages
30. It should be noted that religious opinion does not uniformly condemn euthanasia.
For example:
An interesting pronouncement, upon which there would probably be a wide measure
of agreement, was made by Pope Pius XII before an international audience of
physicians. The Pope said that reanimation techniques were moral, but made it
clear that when life was ebbing hopelessly, physicians might abandon further efforts
to stave off death, or relatives might ask them to desist 'in order to permit the
patient, already virtually dead, to pass on in peace.' On the time of death, the Pope
said that 'Considerations of a general nature permit the belief that human life
continues as long as the vital functions-as distinct from the simple life or organs-
manifest themselves spontaneously or even with the help of artificial proceedings'.
By implication, this asserts that a person may be regarded as dead when all that
is left is 'the simple life or organs'. The Pope cited the tenet of Roman Catholic
doctrine that death occurs at the moment of 'complete and definitive separation of
body and soul'. In practice, he added, the terms 'body' and 'separation' lack
precision. He explained that establishing the exact instant of death in controversial
cases was the task not of the Church but of the physician. New York Times Nov.
25, 1957, at 1, col 3.
Quoted from Williams, supra note 1, at 12 n.11; and see Kalish, Some Variables in
Death Attitndes, 59 3. SocLa PsYcH. 137 (1963).
31. Especially see, Glanville Williams, "Mercy-Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder, 43
lm-N'. L. REv. (1958).
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of agony, weakness and decay." In addition, the fact that many
people, as they die, are fully conscious of their tragic state of deteriora-
tion greatly magnifies the cruelty inherent in forcing them to endure
this loss of dignity against their will.3 3 Dr. Leonard Colebrook has
written that34
•.. in addition to pain many of the unhappy victims of cancer
have to endure the mental misery associated with the presence of a
foul fungating growth; of slow starvation owing to difficulty in
swallowing; of painful and very frequent micturition; of obstruc-
tion of the bowels; of incontinence; and of the utter prostration
that makes of each day and night a "death in life" as the famous
physician, the late Sir William Osler, described it.
Diseases of the nervous system in their turn lead all too often
to crippling paralysis or inability to walk; to severe headaches;
to blindness; to the misery of incontinence and bedsores. Dis-
tressing mental disturbances are often added to these troubles.
Bronchitis, too, with its interminable cough and progressive
shortness of breath, can have its special terrors, which medical
treatment in the late stages can do little to abate.
All these, and many other grievous ills which may beset the
road to death, are often borne with great courage and patience-
even when the burden is many times heavier by reason of lone-
liness and/or poverty. (It should be remembered that only about
32. Consider, for example, the cruel implications of the following case reported by
Doctor Joseph Fletcher, in DowNinG, supra note 1, at 61-62: A minister pays a hospital
visit to a woman in her early seventies, who has now been in the hospital for a week
with what was tentatively thought to be "degenerative arthritis," but has turned out
to be bone cancer. Both of her legs were already fractured when she arrived at the
hospital, and little bits of her bones are now splintering all the time; occasionally, she
has agonizing shaking attacks which aggravate the fracturing. She turns her face away
from the minister and impleads her husband: "I ought to die. Why can't I die?" Surely,
it is cruel and inhumane to keep such a patient alive against her will.
33. See, B. G. GLASER & A. L. STRAUss, AWARENEmSS OF DYING (1965). This is especially
true of those who are "socially dead" which is defined as those who must live with a
terminal illness because the patient perceives that "he is as good as dead" and that his
social role in life has ended. See, Kalish, Social Distance And The Dying, 2 CoMrMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH J. 152 (1966) and Kalish, Life And Death: Dividing The Invisible, 2
Soc. SCI. & MED. 249 (1963). Most terminally ill persons have this perception and prob-
ably develop feelings of isolation, meaninglessness and acute forms of anomie; on the
last see, E. DURIKHEIM, SUICIDE (1951). It has been suggested that dying people may
suffer as much, or more, from deprivation and abrupt emotional isolation from others
than from his illness, Weisman & Hackett, Predilection to Death: Death And Dying As A
Psychiatric Problem, 23 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 232 (1961). And see, Quint, Mastec-
tomy---Symbol of Cure Or Warning Sign?, 29 GEN. PRACTICE 119 (1964); Cappon, The
Dying, 33 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 468 (1959), and Cappon, Attitudes of and Toward The Dying,
87 CANADIAN Man. Assoc. J. 693 (1962).
34. DOWNING, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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half of the dying receive skilled nursing and medical care in
hospitals.) Medical progress has done much to alleviate suffer-
ing during the past century, but, in honesty, it must be admitted
that the process of dying is still very often an ugly business.
Beyond such direct cruelties, our current law also indirectly results
in other cruelties as well, and these must all be weighed in the balance.
For example, it seems exceedingly cruel to compel the spouse and
children of a dying man to witness the ever-worsening stages of his
disease, and to watch the slow, agonizing death of their loved one,
degenerating before their eyes, being transformed from a vital and
robust parent and spouse into a pathetic and humiliated creature, de-
void of human dignity. 5 The psychological trauma that comes from
witnessing such a spectacle may deeply affect, or permanently impair,
the mental and physical health of both children and spouse.3" Finally,
we cannot ignore the residual, indirect cruelty which survives the death
of the afflicted person, and burdens the surviving family with the costs
incurred in the treatment of the prolonged illness. Enormous medical
debts can impair or destroy a child's educational opportunities, for ex-
ample, and recognition of such gloomy prospects will undoubtedly prey
heavily on the mind of the terminally-ill parent or relative, adding to
the pain and suffering which he already endures.T
Thus, it cannot be denied that, at least in this context, our current
35. Sir George Pickering, Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford University holds
that " . .. old people should be allowed to die as comfortably and in as dignified a way
as possible," and he continues saying: "I know of nothing more tragic than the dis-
ruption of a happy and productive family life caused by an ancient, bed-ridden, incon-
tinent and confused parent or grandparent. What might have been a happy and respectful
memory becomes a nightmare and a horror. I still recoil from the sight of old people
being kept alive by a constant monitoring of their heart-beat and the team of nurses
and doctors ready to pounce upon them when it stops." The Heart of the Matter: Ethical
and Social Problems, NEw SciwaisT, Jan. 18, 1968, at 125.
36. Pathological reactions to bereavement occur fairly frequently, especially among
close surviving relatives, and "the whole relationship between the dying and their
partners or close relatives is falsified and distorted in a particular degrading and painful
fashion.' G. GoRn, DEran, GPaEP AND MOUtnMG 17 (1965), and see, Lindemann,
Symptomatology And Management of Acute Grief, 101 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 141 (1944).
Some studies show that death has a higher incidence among those recently widowed,
especially males, than among married persons of similar ages. See J. HINTOT, DynGm
(1967) and Rees and Lutkins,.Mortality of Bereavement, 4 Bamsrr: MEo. J. 13 (1967).
At 169, HINT N, supra, reports irrational hostility and resentment toward doctors on the
part of relatives after the death of a loved one. Furthermore, there seems to be a marked
increase in physical ailments and psychiatric symptoms among persons recently widowed.
See, Parks, Effects of Bereveavement on Physical and Mental Health-A Study of the
Medical Records of Widows, 2 BPaXsH MED. J. 274 (1964).
37. For discussion see, B. G. Gr.Asm & A. L. STRAuss, TiE FOR DYING (1968).
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legal system lacks compassion; it prevents the sufferer from receiving
a merciful death, and forces those who care for him to watch, helplessly,
as he endures his pointless pain. In these respects, ours is a very cruel
law, and this fact constitutes one basic cornerstone of the case for
legalizing voluntary euthanasia: it would prevent cruelty and promote
human dignity by affording human beings the opportunity of escaping
useless suffering by means of merciful death at their request. Of course,
legalization of voluntary euthanasia will not totally eliminate all the
human pain and suffering which accompanies a long terminal illness.
But it will tend to eliminate the law's current indifference to human
misery, and will reduce pain and suffering significantly by placing the
power to terminate misery under the victim's own control. Our legal
system can ill-afford to ignore this humane opportunity for reducing
cruelty.
The second social value which supports the case for voluntary
euthanasia, and promotes the cause of human dignity, is that of liberty.
In this context, our law has got the shoe on the wrong foot from the
very beginning. Why does our law provide that when a person par-
ticipates in voluntary euthanasia it constitutes the crime of murder?
To have fidelity to liberty, the question should be reversed. We should
start from the assumption that all voluntary acts are permissible, and,
in the absence of some legitimate reason to deny it, we would presume
that a doctor and a patient are free to act as they wish. The question
should not be: "Why should people have a legal right to voluntary
euthanasia?" but rather, the appropriate question should be: "Why
should our criminal law restrain the liberty of the doctor and the
patient, denying them from doing what they want?" In a free society
it is the restraint on liberty that must be justified, not the possession
of liberty. The criminal law should not be called upon to repress an
individual's conduct unless such repression is demonstrably necessary
on social grounds. Further, in the case of voluntary euthanasia, this
demonstrably compelling interest must be secular, not religious. Yet it
is entirely unclear what secular social interest is so compelling that it
justifies preventing the incurably-ill sufferer from exercising his liberty
of choice to accelerate death by a few hours, days, or even months; or
what interest justifies the application of criminal deterrents to a vol-
untary euthanasia case.
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With liberty as our basic postulate, restrictions must be justified.
Those persons who would deny or restrict the liberty afforded by the
principle of voluntary euthanasia must sustain the burden of coming
forth and clearly stating the positive, secular, social value to be
achieved by maintaining the lives of incurably-ill persons, or "human
vegetables," against their wills and in depredation of their human
dignity. In addition, they must justify the infringement of the liberty
of doctors as well. Within the limits imposed by law, a doctor's re-
sponsibility to his patient is to prolong worthwhile life, and, failing
that, then to ease his passing. If a doctor, with the advice of a con-
sultant, honestly concludes that a patient's affliction is incurable and
expected to cause severe pain and distress, and genuinely believes that
the best service that can be performed for the suffering patient is to
grant his voluntary request for euthanasia, then what justifies the
criminal law in forbidding the doctor from doing so? No rational
justification appears to me, and until an adequate secular ground is
advanced, there is no reason for denying voluntary euthanasia to the
incurably and terminally ill, or to the so-called "human vegetables."
Why should the law deny a man the ultimate decision about what to
do with his life? In the final analysis, control over one's own death is
a matter of human dignity, and it should not be denied without some
very compelling reasons.
The chief obstacles to acceptance of voluntary euthanasia have
little to do with its, merits. Widespread ignorance, indifference to the
plight of the dying, and misunderstanding of the implications of volun-
tary euthanasia, primarily account for its not having been legalized.
Naturally, dying persons leave few public records of their sufferings,
and because of limited experience, the living are only slightly aware of
the human trials and misery involved in the process of death. More-
over, the living try to keep thoughts about death far removed from
their conscious minds. And, it should be noted that the dying do not
organize into lobbying groups. Thus, while the case for voluntary
euthanasia is convincing, it lacks organizational backing, and finds its
only potential for success in the duty of legislators to do that which is
right, even though pressured in the opposite direction by vocal or in-
fluential lobbyists. At this point, it is therefore appropriate to consider
the secular arguments which have been advanced in opposition to
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voluntary euthanasia, and which have tended to reinforce the inertia
of our legislators.18
The major objections to legalization of voluntary euthanasia can be
grouped under six headings:
1. The claim that doctors are already performing whatever mercy
killings may be necessary;
2. The difficulty of ascertaining voluntary consent;
3. The risk of incorrect medical diagnosis;
4. The possibility of new medical discoveries;
5. The claim that the use of modern drugs to control pain obviates
the need for resort to voluntary euthanasia; and
6. The "wedge" or "slippery-slope" objection.
1. The first objection which is sometimes advanced against legaliz-
ing voluntary euthanasia is startling indeed: it is that mercy-killing
already exists among some of our most reputable medical practitioners,
and that there is no remnant need for such legislation.39 Stated so
baldly, this argument is Janus-faced, holding on the one hand that
doctors are to be commended for presently committing acts of volun-
tary euthanasia and ought to be encouraged to continue such actions,
but holding on the other hand the we ought not alter our present law,
but should persist in treating the doctor's act as illegal homicide if by
some mischance he is investigated and brought under our system of
criminal law. Thus, these persons who object to change argue simul-
taneously that, with respect to the same act, it is right to break the
criminal law, and it is wrong to break the criminal law. Obviously, those
who make this argument lack the courage of their convictions; they
refuse to give the force of law to their feelings about the propriety of
voluntary euthanasia; instead, they expect doctors to take heroic risks.
The extent to which doctors practice voluntary euthanasia is un-
known,4 ° but there is little doubt that the perpetuation of our present
38. Professor Yale Kamisar in, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-
Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. Rlv. 969 (1958), has made an excellent contribution to
discussions about voluntary euthanasia. His arguments do not oppose voluntary eutha-
nasia on its merits, but are concerned with its possible procedural errors and abuses
(which can be met by a properly drafted statute), and with the fear that legalizing
voluntary euthanasia will lead on to legalizing involuntary euthanasia, and perhaps,
genocide. Cf. Chesterton, Euthanasia and Murder, 8 Am. REv. 486, 490 (1937).
39. Stated in W. R. Matthews, Voluntary Euthanasia: The Ethical Aspect, in
DowrNnG, supra note 1, at 25, 28.
40. Levisohn conducted a survey receiving 156 responses from Chicago surgeons and
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criminal treatment of euthanasia necessarily deters many doctors who
would otherwise be willing to engage in the practice. Under this first
objection to the principle of voluntary euthanasia, the achievement of
non-cruelty and human dignity depend upon chance-the chance that
the suffering patient has selected a doctor who is willing to risk reputa-
tion, profession, liberty and family in order to relieve his patient's
pain and suffering. The objection ignores the real needs of suffering
patients, and is thus not only cowardly, but inhumane as well.
2. A second common objection to voluntary euthanasia relates to
the issue of voluntary consent.41 The argument is that the afflicted
patient may be so crazed by pain or stupefied by drugs that he is in-
capable of giving truly voluntary consent to euthanasia. This argument
must be countered. Consent to euthanasia must be voluntary.
The way to insure that a person's consent is legally "voluntary" is
to require that it be given while he is rational and sane, well before
he is either crazed by pain or stupefied by drugs. Thus, a statute
legalizing voluntary euthanasia should require that a patient execute
a formal document declaring his desire for euthanasia. This document
should be attested to by two disinterested witnesses, and there should
be a required thirty-day "cooling-off period" after the declaration of
consent is made, before the patient becomes eligible for euthanasia.
The statute should also require the attending physician, after lapse of
the thirty-day period, but before administration of euthanasia to a
mentally responsible patient, to affirm that the prior declaration of
consent is still in accord with the ascertained desires of the patient at
that time. The legislation should also provide for some protection
against fraudulent statements by witnesses and doctors, and should,
as a final precaution, authorize revocation of a declaration of consent
at any time by any clear act by the patient, or on his order.
Obviously, only that class of persons who are incurably and ter-
minally ill and who are expected to suffer severe distress will be
sufficiently conscious and rational to satisfy statutory consent require-
ments beyond making the initial declaration. A requirement of re-
internists. He asked: "'In your opinion do physicians actually practice euthanasia in
instances of incurable adult sufferers?' Sixty-one percent agreed that physicians actually
practiced it, if not in the affirmative at least in the negative or in terms of the omission
to use every known medical measure to sustain life." Levisohn, Voluntary Mercy Deaths,
8 J. FoR. an. 57, 68 (1961).
41. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 978-93.
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peated rational requests for euthanasia by the patient clearly will not
be susceptible of fulfillment by patients in the category of so-called
"human vegetables." But, as to this latter group, instead of requiring
repeated requests by the patient himself to indicate continuing con-
sent, the statute could provide that the new request be made by one
of his closest relatives. But, such a provision would unwisely place a
burden of guilt on any close relative, who, having been called upon to
give final authorization for the death of his parent, or spouse, would
have to go through life knowing that he gave the final word authorizing
the death of parent or spouse. There is no reason to burden a close
relative with such a load of guilt. A simple declaration of consent made
by the patient well in advance, when in sound mind, can adequately
demonstrate voluntariness in the case of the so-called "human vege-
tables."
But as to the other permissible candidates for euthanasia, the above-
described statutory requirement of repeated rational requests for
euthanasia would be an easily administered measure for insuring the
voluntariness of the patient's consent. More extensive restrictions,
designed to guarantee voluntariness further, by invoking some ad-
ditional administrative or judicial machinery, or perhaps court orders,
would be time-consuming, inhumane, and self-defeating-they would
be cumbersome and unduly increase the time during which pain and
suffering must be endured. Voluntary consent is sufficiently insured
by a statute requiring repeated voluntary requests, a twice-witnessed
declaration, and independent medical collaboration on the issues of
necessity and consent. Finally, of course, any statute legalizing volun-
tary euthanasia should contain a provision allowing the revocation of
a declaration at any time by the patient, or on his order.
Even so, many will be concerned about the possibility of "con-
spiracy" among relatives. Suppose, for example, an incurably and
terminally ill person requests euthanasia in order to relieve not only
his own pain but the anguish of his relatives as well. Shall a doctor
consider this request to be voluntary? This dilemma can be resolved
by a statutory provision requiring that the doctor determine whether
the relatives are insisting on euthanasia, or whether the motivating
force in fact comes from the patient and his suffering. If the patient
is incurably and terminally ill and expected to suffer severe distress,
and has made the necessary prior declaration, I see no reason to deny
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him euthanasia simply because he bases his request on his concern
for relieving his family of the attendant anxieties, rather than a desire
for relief from physical pains. On the other hand, of course, if pressure
by relatives is the sole or primary motivating force behind the patient's
request for euthanasia, then his consent is not fully voluntary, even
though he may have given voluntary consent at some prior time. The
risk of conspiring relatives can be moderated by appropriate statutory
safeguards.
The possibility of a conspiracy against the patient by the doctor
and relatives, or by several doctors, probably cannot be fully guarded
against by any voluntary euthanasia statute (or any statute at all).
But a properly drafted voluntary euthanasia statute can minimize
these risks by requiring that the patient's declaration be witnessed,
that official records be kept, and that the attending doctor's diagnosis
be independently corroborated by a consulting doctor. These require-
ments tend to make euthanasia a public activity, thus rendering a
conspiracy much more difficult. Naturally, we can conjure up horrible
hypotheticals involving dishonest and unethical doctors-for example,
the possibility that a doctor might keep a patient alive as long as pos-
sible in order to collect the last available penny of fees. But the im-
portant points are that voluntary euthanasia procedures will not aug-
ment the probability of such aberrance, and that a voluntary euthana-
sia statute will be no less successful at combating such abuse than our
present malpractice regulations. Ultimately, the best protection against
dishonest, conspiring doctors lies in the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.
In conclusion, there is some force in the argument against voluntary
euthanasia that truly voluntary consent cannot always be satisfactorily
obtained, but the thrust of that objection can be met by a properly
drafted statute-voluntary consent can be satisfactorily guaranteed.
3. The third objection set against legalization of voluntary eutha-
nasia concerns the risk of mistaken medical diagnosis.42 This objection
relies for its plausibility on the assumption that euthanasia will be
administered well before the patient has reached the final stages of an
incurable and terminal illness-that is, before the nature of his illness
becomes patently clear and death inevitable. There is no reason to
42. Id. at 1005
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indulge this assumption; euthanasia is, by principle, to be administered
by physicians only as a last resort, after the final progression of the
disease has become obvious.
Naturally, doctors, being human, do make honest mistakes, and the
possibility of mistaken diagnosis is present in nearly every medical
case, not just those involving voluntary euthanasia. Mistaken diagnosis
in "ordinary" cases can have equally lethal consequences. However,
in the case of voluntary euthanasia, the risk of such mistakes can be
reduced substantially if the enabling statute allows euthanasia only
after two physicians (one a consultant) have certified in writing that
the patient is suffering from an incurable terminal condition. Of course,
each of the two doctors should be subject to criminal penalties for
any intentional falsification of a diagnosis or written certification in
order to bring about a patient's death.
Moreover, the risk of mistaken diagnosis is not as great with respect
to the limited categories of patients who are eligible for voluntary
euthanasia.43 Such a mistake would be especially unlikely in the case
of a "human vegetable" who has a condition of brain damage or de-
terioration which has so severely and permanently impaired his normal
faculties that he is incapable of leading a rational existence, or in the
case of a man afflicted with a disease which is so evidently progressing
into its final stages that occasion arises for his doctor to certify that
he is incurably and terminally ill.44 In any event, if there is a question
regarding the diagnosis, and irreversible euthanasia is the alternative,
there is no doubt that doctors will err on the side of prolonging life
rather than destroying it. Such is the tendency of their medical train-
ing and their professional obligation.
Thus, while there is always a chance of a mistaken medical diagnosis,
there is every reason to believe that a well-drafted voluntary eutha-
nasia statute can reduce the probability of such error to a level less
than that confronting the average non-euthanasia patient. Although
there is a slight risk, I cannot believe that the slight possibility of mis-
43. Millard, The Case for Euthanasia, 136 FORTNIGH=hY REV. 701 (1931).
44. Medical opponents of voluntary euthanasia readily admit that the percentage of
correct diagnosis is exceptionally high in cancer cases which would be the disease
probably producing most euthanasia patients; see, Miller, Why I Oppose Mercy Killings,
WOMAN'S HOME COMPANION, June 1950, at 38, and see, Laszlo, et al, Errors in Diagnosis
and Management of Cancer, Part I, 33 ANNALS INT. MED. 670 (1950); Laszlo & Spencer,
Medical Problems in the Management of Cancer, 37 MED. CLiN. N.A. 869 (1953).
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taken diagnosis is great enough to outweigh the benefits to be obtained
by legalizing voluntary euthanasia.
4. A closely related objection is the possibility of future, miraculous
medical discoveries." The objection is that, in some future case, there
will be a patient to whom euthanasia has been administered and who
might have been "saved" by a subsequent medical discovery. If ac-
cepted, the theory of this objection would require that we leave to their
demise all patients who are now in pain and dying from various
diseases, relying on the mere chance that sometime in the future there-
may be some medical discovery or innovation which makes possible
the cure of some fatal disease (although we do not know which one it
will be).
But, in the first place, it seems obvious that, whatever force there
is in this objection, it has no application to the class of so-called
"human vegetables;" there can be no medical discovery that will re-
store or "cure" a physically destroyed or deteriorated brain. And, on
examination, this objection can also be seen to have no force in its
application to those persons diagnosed as incurably and terminally ill.
If a new medical discovery is made, of course, it will stop administra-
tion of euthanasia in all cases to which the discovery applies. Thus,
the force of this objection can apply only to those few cases where
euthanasia may have been administered immediately before a new
medical discovery became available. It is critical to note that the im-
portant time for consideration is not the moment at which the dis-
covery is made, but rather the time at which it becomes available for
use. Furthermore, the only cases of voluntary euthanasia which would
be relevant here would necessarily involve patients who are in the final
stages of an incurable illness, and these patients will neither need nor
request euthanasia until they reach the final distress of their disease.
Under these circumstances, the likelihood is that, by the time voluntary
euthanasia is administered, the progression of the fatal disease will
have so weakened or impaired the patient's body processes that any
new medical discovery, even if immediately available for use, would
be of little aid to him (although it might be enormously valuable to a
person whose disease has not yet progressed to its terminal stages). It
45. rami ar, supra note 1, at 998, and Williams, supra note 1, at 8.
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is improbable that a new medical discovery would enable doctors to
save patients who are actually in the final stages of terminal illness;
rather, the probabilities are that any person to whom euthanasia has
been administered could not have been saved.
Even if we indulge the improbable assumption that some new dis-
covery will be useful in curing the terminal stages of a presently
incurable illness, it is yet unlikely that administration of euthanasia
to the patient will deprive him of the continued life which the dis-
covery offers. Practical implementation of a new medical discovery is
not instantaneous, no matter how rapid the word of its discovery may
spread. Doctors know about a new discovery long before they are able
to use it; thus, consideration of voluntary euthanasia need not take
into account new medical discoveries unless they are available for use.
Indeed, the lapse of the time between the moment of discovery and
the time its fruits are made available for use may be extreme. In the
case of new drugs, there must be testing, manufacture, and distribu-
tion; in the case of new techniques for cure, information must be
compiled and disseminated, and therapists must be trained. During
this warning period between the time of discovery and the time of
implementation, doctors will not administer euthanasia if there is any
possibility of saving the patient. Thus, when the new discovery finally
becomes available for use, application of the principle of voluntary
euthanasia will probably not have produced any "mistakes." In the
last analysis, the objection based upon the possibility of future medical
discoveries has no validity.
5. The fifth objection to legalizing voluntary euthanasia relies on
the pain-controlling capacities of modern drugs.46 It asserts that these
drugs can satisfy all the objectives sought to be achieved by voluntary
euthanasia and, hence, the latter is irrelevant. Thus, the question is
whether modern drugs do in fact achieve all that a voluntary euthanasia
statute can achieve. First of all, we must again exclude from our con-
sideration those persons-the so-called "human vegetables"-whose
primary desire is not to be relieved of pain, but rather to discontinue
their necessarily irrational existence, a purpose which cannot be served
by use of any of our modern drugs.
In the remaining category of cases involving patients who are in-
46. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 1008.
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curably and terminally ill, it is true that significant amounts of physical
pain can sometimes (though not always) be controlled by drugs. As
Glanville Williams has pointed out, drugs do save some few people
from extreme physical pain, but they often fail "to save them from
an artificial, twilight existence, with nausea, giddiness, and extreme
restlessness as well as the long hours of consciousness of a hopeless
condition."," Thus, many of the basic miseries of the dying can only
be overcome through euthanasia. Drugs are inadequate for this purpose,
and, as Professor Williams observes, we must decide "whether the un-
intelligent brutality of such an existence is to be imposed on one who
wishes to end it . .. " Furthermore, recent research has shown that
many people are aware of their impending deaths,8 and to the extent
that such awareness produces psychological anguish and depression,
it seems clear that drugs controlling physical pain alone will be of little
value in comparison to the total relief afforded by voluntary euthanasia.
In addition, of course, the administration of drugs to a patient cannot
relieve the mental anguish suffered by a spouse or child.
Moreover, insofar as physical misery alone is concerned, there are
diseases for which modern drugs fail to offer complete relief.49 For
example, a person afflicted with cancer of the throat may be able to
swallow or breathe only if he is willing to endure great pain (which is
present well before he reaches the final stages of the disease). Further-
more, persons dying, both at home and in the hospital, do not always
receive the massive doses of drugs necessary to relieve their extreme
pain. Despite the availability of non-narcotic painkillers, narcotics
such as morphine are sometimes used as heavy-pain killers, and these
drugs lose their effectiveness with continuous use, necessitating con-
stantly increasing dosages.50 This facet of drug therapy also puts our
doctors in a difficult situation, because ultimately a point is reached
47. Williams, supra note 1, at 8-9. He goes on to describe a "dear friend of mine, who
died of cancer of the bowel, spent his last months in just this state, under the influence
of morphine, which deadened pain, but vomiting incessantly, day in and day out."
48. J. M. H[mToN, DynzO (1967); B. G. GLAsER & A. L. STRAUss, AwARENEss or
DmG (1965), and J. M. Hinton, The Physical and Mental Distress of Dying, 32
QuARTERLY J. MED. 1 (1963).
49. See, Eu mASIA Socmrv oF ENGLAND, A PLAN PoR VOLuNTARY EuTA-AsrA 7-8
(2d. rev. ed. 1962), and DowNnG, supra note 1, at 13-24.
50. See, THr MANAGEM=T Or PAN In CAwcER (Schiffrin ed. 1956), and Wolff, Hardy
& Goodell, Studies on Pain Measurement of the Effect of Morphine, Codeine, and other
Opiates on the Pain Threshold and an Analysis of Their Relation to the Pain Experience,
19 J. CL mL INWS G. 659 (1940).
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where the needed dose of narcotic is so large that it may either con-
siderably speed up the death of the patient, or induce it immediately.
Fear of the law, religious scruples, or considerations of medical ethics,
may deter a doctor from administering such massive doses of drugs in
these cases, and consequently the patient and his family suffer.
In summary, while we must concede the usefulness of modern drugs
in controlling pain, it is impossible to conclude that they achieve all
that a voluntary euthanasia statute can achieve. Drugs should be looked
upon as a complement to voluntary euthanasia, not as a substitute.
Drugs are not equally useful in all cases, and even in cases where ef-
fective drugs are available they may have other undesirable effects.
This means, not that we ought to abandon drugs, but that we ought to
conjoin their use with a program of legalized voluntary euthanasia.
Modern drugs are helpful, yet even with them there are people dying
in grief, agony, and weakness who request a speedy end to their miseries
-the need for voluntary euthanasia persists.
6. The last resort of the opponents of voluntary euthanasia is re-
liance on the "wedge" argument." Few proposals for change in law
escape criticism by some version of this---"wedge" or "slippery slope"
or "camel's nose"--argument; and the more important the proposed
legal change, the more vehement the argument is likely to be. In our
present context, the objection asserts that voluntary euthanasia ought
not be legalized because legalization of other abhorrent practices might
follow. In this view, the legalization of voluntary euthanasia is viewed
as the opening wedge or precursor for the future legalization of invol-
untary euthanasia, murder, and perhaps even genocide. Significantly,
this argument does not address itself to the merits of voluntary eu-
thanasia, but instead conjures up a parade of horribles applicable to
subjects other than voluntary euthanasia.
The abhorrent, genocidal practices of Nazi Germany weigh heavily
upon the minds of many who advance this argument. But America is
not Nazi Germany, and we maintain no master-race philosophy. Our
American experience has been unique in precisely the contrary manner,
being constitutionally founded upon beliefs in the liberty and dignity
of the person. Neither the American experience, nor the Fourteenth
51. Kamisar, supra note 1, at 1030.
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Amendment to our Constitution, is compatible with the sort of racial
laws enacted by Nazi Germany, and no state legislature will, or could
constitutionally, enact legislation authorizing the extermination of any
minority group, religious or racial, The American tradition presses in
the opposite direction. We started with compulsory sterilization laws,
for example, but have since moved away from them, toward laws al-
lowing voluntary sterilization. 2 Anyone who seriously considers recent
American history will discern our consistent and growing concern for
the protection of the rights of minorities as a necessary adjunct of
individual liberty.
Voluntary euthanasia should be judged on its own merits. The
"wedge" argument should be dismissed because it does not address
itself to the question of voluntary euthanasia. The objection serves
only to confuse discussion by injecting irrelevant emotional concerns
over abhorrent practices. Specifically, in this context, the "wedge"
argument confuses voluntary euthanasia with involuntary euthanasia.
But how would this "wedge" ever gain a foothold? Voluntary euthana-
sia is in principle proposed to be administered only at the express re-
quest of an adult who understands the implications of his request. There
is no compulsion. Free choice is a cornerstone of voluntary euthanasia.
If compulsion were a part of the principle, it would destroy its own
justification, which rests on the proposition that each of us should be
free to choose for ourselves a dignified and painless death. Thus, the
"wedge" objection is both irrelevant and unsupportable, and should
be dismissed.
In summary appraisal of the case in favor of legalizing voluntary
euthanasia, one must conclude that it is both strong and convincing.
Most objections to voluntary euthanasia fail on analysis, and those
that have some force and validity can be met by a properly drafted
statute. Nevertheless, legalization of voluntary euthanasia is an issue
which should be judged relatively in our social context, not by reference
to "absolute" religious or secular values. Increasing concern over the
ugliness and human degradations of incurable suffering can no longer
be dealt with solely by an unthinking reference to the "absolute
sanctity" of life, requiring the prolongation of a suffering existence as




long as medically possible. The agonizing aspect of some deaths re-
quires that the sanctity of life be weighed against the competing values
of compassion, liberty and human dignity. On balance, these con-
siderations dictate that the only legally just solution is to afford our
afflicted citizens the opportunity of choosing a quick and merciful
death. Legalizing voluntary euthanasia is the appropriate way to make
a friend of death, which need not be always an enemy. A voluntary
euthanasia statute constitutes a significant step on the path toward





1. Authorization of euthanasia.
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Schedule--Form of declaration.
A BILL ENTITLED
AN ACT to provide in certain circumstances for
the administration of euthanasia to persons who
voluntarily request it and who are suffering
from an irremediable condition, and to enable
persons to request in advance the administra-
tion of euthanasia in the event of their suffering
from such a condition at a future date.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, AS
FOLLOWS:-
53. Adapted from DOWNING, supra note 1, at 201.
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1.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,
it shall be lawful for a physician to administer
euthanasia to a qualified patient who has pre-
viously made a declaration that is lawfully in
force at the time of the administering of eu-
thanasia.
(2) For the purposes of this Act:
"physician" means a registered med-
ical practitioner;
"euthansia" means the painless in-
ducement of death;
"qualified patient" means a patient
over the age that qualifies a person
to vote in either state or national
elections, and in respect of whom
two physicians, one being of con-
sultant status, have certified in
writing that the patient appears to
them to be suffering from an ir-
remediable condition;
"irremediable condition" means either
(1) a serious physical illness which
is diagnosed as incurable and ter-
minal, and which is expected to
cause a person severe distress, or to
render him incapable of a rational
existence, or (2) a condition of
brain damage or deterioration such
that a person's normal mental facul-
ties are severely and irreparably
impaired to such an extent that he
has been rendered incapable of lead-
ing a rational existence;
"declaration" means a witnessed dec-
laration in writing made substan-
tially in the form set out in the
schedule to this Act.
2.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this sec-
tion, a declaration shall come into force 30 days
after being made and shall remain in force,
unless revoked, for 3 years.
(2) A declaration re-executed after the












prior to its expiration date shall remain in force,
unless revoked, during the lifetime of the
declarant.
3.-A declaration may be revoked at any
time by destruction or by notice of cancellation
shown on its face, or by any other clearly com-
municated act of revocation, effected, in any
case, by the declarant or to his order.
4.7-(1) Before causing euthanasia to be ad-
ministered to a mentally responsible patient
the physician in charge shall make sure that
the patient's consent is voluntarily given by
ascertaining to the physician's reasonable satis-
faction that the declaration and all steps pro-
posed to be taken under it currently are in
accord with the patient's wishes, and if the
physician should determine that the motivation
or desire for euthanasia is supplied by relatives,
or anyone other than the patient, then he shall
not cause euthanasia to be administered.
(2) Euthanasia shall be deemed to be ad-
ministered by a physician if treatment pre-
scribed by a physician is given to the patient
by a registered nurse.
(3) No person shall be under any duty,
whether by contract or by any statutory or
other legal requirement, to participate in any
aspect of treatment or euthanasia authorized
by this Act to which he has a conscientious ob-
jection.
5.-(I) A physician or nurse who, acting in
good faith, causes euthanasia to be administered
to a qualified patient in accordance with what
the person so acting reasonably believes to be
the patient's declaration and wishes shall not
be guilty of any offense.
(2) Physicians and nurses who have taken
part in the administration of euthanasia shall
be deemed not to be in breach of any profes-
sional oath or affirmation.
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6.-(1) It shall be an offense punishable on
information or indictment by a sentence of life
imprisonment for any person wilfully to con-
ceal, destroy, falsify or forge a declaration with
intent to create the false impression that an-
other person desires euthanasia; furthermore,
it shall be an offense punishable on information
or indictment by a sentence up to ten years
imprisonment or a fine of up to $5,000, or both,
for any person wilfully to conceal, destroy,
falsify or forge a declaration with intent to
create the false impression that another person
does not desire, or no longer desires, euthanasia.
(2) A person signing a declaration by way
of attestation who wilfully puts his signature to
a statement he knows to be false shall be
deemed to have committed an offense under
RCW 9.72.010 (Perjury).
7.-No policy of insurance that has been in
force for 12 months shall be vitiated or legally
impaired in any way, by the administration of
euthanasia to the insured.
8.-For the removal of doubt it is declared
that a patient suffering from an irremediable
condition reasonably thought in his case to be
terminal shall be entitled to the administration
of whatever quantity of drugs may be required
to keep him free from pain, and such a patient
in whose case severe distress cannot be other-
wise relieved, shall, if he so requests, be en-
titled to drugs rendering him continuously un-
conscious.
9.-The Director of Public Institutions shall
make regulations under this Act for determin-
ing classes of persons who may or may not sign
a declaration by way of attestation, for regulat-
ing the care and custody of declarations, for
appointing, with their consent, hospital phy-
sicians having responsibility in relation to
patients who have made or wish to make a
declaration, and for the prescribing of any mat-
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ters he may think fit to prescribe for achieving
the purposes of this Act.
Short title and 10.-This Act may be cited as the Voluntary
extent Euthanasia Act of....
SCHEDULE
Section 1.
Form of Declaration Under the Voluntary Euthanasia
Act of 1971




I DECLARE that I voluntarily subscribe to the code set out under the
following articles:-
A. If I should at any time suffer from a serious physical illness or
impairment reasonably thought in my case to be incurable and expected
to cause me severe distress or render me incapable of rational existence,
I request the administration of euthanasia at a time or in circumstances
to be indicated or specified by me or, if it is apparent that I have
become incapable of giving directions, at the discretion of the physician
in charge of my case.
B. In the event of my suffering from any of the conditions specified
above, I request that no active steps should be taken, and in particular
that no resuscitatory techniques should be used, to prolong my life or
restore me to consciousness.
C. This declaration is to remain in force unless I revoke it, which I
may do at any time by any clearly communicated act, and any request
I may make concerning action to be taken or withheld in connection
with this declaration will be made without further formalities.
I WISH it to be understood that I have confidence in the good faith of
my relatives and physicians, and fear degeneration and indignity far
more than I fear premature death. I ask and authorize the physician in
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charge of my case to bear these statements in mind when considering




WE TESTIFY that the above-named declarant voluntarily *[signed]
*[was unable to write but voluntarily assented to] this declaration in
our presence, and appeared to us to appreciate its full significance. We
do not know of any pressure being brought on him to make the dec-
laration, and we believe it is made by his own wish. So far as we are
aware, we are entitled to attest this declaration and do not stand to
benefit by the death of the declarant.
Signed by Signed by
[Signed by [Signed by
on re-execution]. on re-execution].
* Strike out whichever words do not apply.
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